Hong Kong, May 6 : China is a police state, a nation whose people are under constant surveillance, plus it owns one of the world's largest espionage networks. It is unclear how many "spies" China has, but last year the BBC quoted a Western intelligence official who estimated China has some 600,000 people working on intelligence and security.
Of course, it is difficult to quantify such things, especially because China utilizes not only paid employees, but proxy organizations like the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and also civilians that collect data for the government. The UFWD is designed to look benign, and so it often takes names like "friendship associations". All these organizations, subservient to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman Xi Jinping, have the aim of implementing a "community of common destiny".
The main Chinese organization responsible for counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, domestic surveillance and national security intelligence is the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which was formed in 1983.
Despite Beijing's vehement protestations that it does not spy, there are growing numbers of allegations and the evidence that Chinese espionage is widespread and endemic.
One of the latest incidents involves Germany, where a former aide to scandal-hit lawmaker Maximilian Krah from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was charged for spying on behalf of Beijing. The accused, named as Jian G, is believed to have been working for China since 2002.
Krah's assistant had allegedly "gathered information on the deliberations and decisions of the European parliament" for Chinese intelligence, according to German prosecutors. This included "procuring more than 500 documents, some of which had been classified as particularly sensitive". Other accusations concerned spying on Chinese dissidents in Germany and gathering intelligence on other AfD leaders. He even posed as an opponent of the Chinese government on social media to burnish his credentials.
However, Guo Jiakun, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, told media on 30 April, "The accusation of the so-called threat of 'Chinese spies' is groundless and ill-intentioned vilification. We urge Germany to stop smearing China and do something real to keep the sound momentum of development for bilateral relations." This is typical of the Chinese government, instantly dismissing accusations without tackling the evidence, and countering with its own allegations of "smearing" China.
What about the United Kingdom? In August 2023, Ken McCallum, Director General of MI5, revealed that China's MSS had approached more than 20,000 UK nationals online in recruitment attempts. These approaches, designed to gain confidential information, were predominantly done through LinkedIn.
France has reported a similar Chinese modus operandi. In 2018, a French intelligence report claimed the MSS had approached 4,000 individuals on LinkedIn. Meanwhile, the German government disclosed that 10,000+ approaches had been made to its citizens.
In its latest Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, released in March, the USA claimed: "Beijing will continue to expand its coercive and subversive malign influence activities to weaken the United States internally and globally ... Through these efforts, the PRC seeks to suppress critical views and critics of China within the United States and worldwide, and sow doubts in US leadership and strength. Beijing is likely to feel emboldened to use malign influence more regularly in coming years, particularly as it fields AI to improve its capabilities and avoid detection."
A lot of Chinese espionage occurs through electronic means. The US report said China "remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to US government, private-sector and critical infrastructure networks." It presented evidence such as China's Volt Typhoon campaign to pre-position attack access on critical infrastructure, as well as Salt Typhoon to compromise US telecommunications infrastructure.
This US intelligence report asserted "China has stolen hundreds of gigabytes of intellectual property from companies in Asia, Europe and North America in an effort to leapfrog over technological hurdles, with as much as 80% of US economic espionage cases as of 2021 involving PRC entities."
China's Foreign Ministry lambasted the US report, describing it as "an irresponsible, biased and scaremongering piece that seeks to promote the false 'China threat' narrative and fan major-country rivalry".
Of course, lax behavior at the top of the US government can make China's job easier. Because of "Signalgate", which claimed National Security Advisor Mike Waltz's job, both China and Russia may have been aware of imminent US strikes against Houthis in Yemen, and passed information on to the intended victims.
It is presumed that Russia and China can intercept Signal communications. At a House Intelligence Committee hearing, Republican Don Bacon said, "There's no doubt that Russia and China saw this stuff within hours of the actual attacks on Yemen or the Houthis."
China is also believed to be actively recruiting US federal workers who recently lost their jobs, after Elon Musk's scything blade decimated workforces in a cost-slashing attempt. For example, four Chinese companies sharing the furtive Smiao Intelligence website's IP address were actively courting laid-off workers. These Chinese firms placed ads to recruit workers, although it is still unclear if these activities were related to Chinese government-led intelligence efforts.
Interestingly, in recent days the CIA released two new Mandarin-language videos designed to persuade Chinese officials to spy for the USA. A tweet from CIA Director John Ratcliffe said, "One of the primary roles of the CIA is to collect intelligence...by recruiting assets that can help us steal secrets."
The two-minute videos provided an online link for prospective Chinese to register their details. The productions attempt to leverage disillusionment within China. One video, for example, plays on party members' perpetual fears that they may be scooped up by Xi's anti-graft campaign. The narrator says, "As I rise within the party, I watch those above me get discarded like worn-out shoes, one after another. But now I realize that my fate is just as precarious as theirs."
The second video seeks to tap disenchantment among the younger generation who cannot find work or get ahead, whilst corrupt CCP cadres fill their boots. In October 2024, targeting Chinese, Iranian and North Korean citizens, the CIA also released a video that gave step-by-step instructions on how to securely contact the agency online.
Such videos might seem amateurish attempts at recruiting spies, and one wonders if their prospects for success are slim at best. As one person commented on X, "Those two clumsy and laughable videos only show your ignorance and incompetence, and how dangerous it will be working for you." Nonetheless, a CIA official told Reuters, "If it weren't working, we wouldn't be making more videos." The CIA claims the videos are penetrating China's "great firewall" of internet censorship.
The FBI also warned about Chinese activities. It says on its website: "The counterintelligence and economic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China and the CCP are a grave threat to the economic wellbeing and democratic values of the United States ... The Chinese government is employing tactics that seek to influence lawmakers and public opinion to achieve policies that are more favourable to China."
Elsewhere, a New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service report issued last year warned, "The intelligence arm of the PRC is well known for using professional social networking sites to identify unwitting candidates, including New Zealanders." It also warned that China uses deceptive, coercive or corruptive methods, including long-term influence building, to ensnare citizens.
Chinese spies are just as active in Asia too. In late April, just two weeks before Philippine midterm elections, the authorities arrested a Chinese man who was accused of conducting surveillance near the country's election commission office. Ferdinand Lavin, spokesman for the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation, said the Macau passport holder had visited the site three times.
The man had an "IMSI catcher" in the rear of his car, a device that mimics a cell tower and can snatch messages from the air in a 1-3 km radius. Lavin said the suspect had also visited locations such as the Philippine Supreme Court, Philippine Department of Justice and US Embassy.
China immediately disavowed any knowledge of the man, saying, "We will not and have no interest in interfering in such internal affairs of the Philippines." A Chinese spokesman added, "We also advise individual politicians in the Philippines not to take the chance to hype up issues related to China, make something out of nothing and seize the opportunity to profit."
As part of an ongoing bilateral tit-for-tat exchange, China announced on 3 April that it had arrested three Filipinos for espionage, after Manila arrested five other Chinese nationals a week earlier.
Over in South Korea, its National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported eleven separate incidents of Chinese people photographing military bases and other sensitive facilities such as ports and airports since June 2024. Most were Chinese short-term visitors who claimed they were just taking travel souvenirs.
However, the NIS assessed they were "deliberate attempts to circumvent Korean law", constituting low-intensity intelligence activities aimed at gathering information on US and Korean defence capabilities. The NIS stated, "We are preparing response protocols and working to improve information-sharing among counterintelligence agencies."
However, Taiwan is the real hotbed of Chinese spying. Former Military Intelligence Bureau director Liu Te-liang recently estimated the number of Chinese spies in Taiwan is likely higher than a previous, and dated, estimate of 5,000. Liu warned that the Chinese spies could be embedded in government bodies, political parties, think tanks and corporations, although it typically takes 2-3 years to gather evidence in such cases.
Indeed, a string of espionage cases in Taiwan have brought the topic of Chinese spying to the fore. In March, for instance, a Taiwanese court charged four soldiers, three of whom worked in the presidential security team, for spying for China. They each received sentences of up to seven years. They had received relatively paltry payments ranging from USD 7,850 to USD 20,000 in exchange for taking photos of sensitive documents.
In March, President Lai Ching-te designated China as a "foreign hostile power," enabling a swathe of new measures to counter Chinese intelligence efforts, such as reinstating military courts to hear cases of espionage. Many of those arrested in Taiwan for spying are current or retired military personnel. Taipei reported that 64 people were arrested for spying for China in 2024, compared to 48 in 2023 and just ten in 2022.
China is paranoid about foreign spies within its own borders too. It has a very active public campaign urging the populace to watch out for espionage, and the once-secretive MSS now has a massive following on social media.
China's Anti-Espionage Law was amended on 26 April 2023, and the revised law came into effect on 1 July 2023. The law is rather ambiguous when it comes to defining espionage and what activities are harmful to national security. For example, even collecting publicly available documents that do not include state secrets could constitute an act of espionage if the state believes it infringes upon Chinese national interests. Of course, China deliberately keeps the wording of the law ambiguous so it can prosecute anyone it wishes.
The law stipulates, for example, that responsibility for acts of espionage by foreign institutions, organizations or individuals must be legally pursued. Interestingly, the MSS recently gave German diplomats and businesspeople in China a briefing about the impact of the revised Anti-Espionage Law. This move to brief foreigners is thought to be unprecedented for the MSS.
Nor is this broad law limited to Chinese territory, for Beijing can apply it to activities conducted anywhere in the world. As an example, the MSS detained a Japanese woman in 2015, purportedly for violating the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China and the Anti-Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China, even while she resided in Japan.
Apparently, the woman shared information about China's policy on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japanese government officials. Later, she was arrested in Shanghai whilst on a business trip, and was duly sentenced to six years in prison.
Such actions by China should give pause to anyone traveling to China, as there is potential for them to be treated like this Japanese woman.